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Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A Proposal for a Consistent
Theory of Tort Recovery for
Bystanders and Direct Victims
Julie A. Greenberg*
American courts traditionally have been suspicious of emotional
distress injury claims.' Most jurisdictions still deny recovery for neg-
ligently inflicted emotional distress injuries unless plaintiffs can
prove they have suffered some accompanying physical injury, illness
or other physical consequence.2 Jurisdictions that allow plaintiffs
who have not suffered physical consequences to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED)3 usually impose other barriers
to recovery.4 Two major reasons have been advanced to justify these
additional obstacles: (1) emotional distress claims may be fraudulent;
and (2) excessive liability may be imposed upon defrndants whose
culpability may be relatively minor.5 Based upon these considera-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, San Di-
ego; B.A., 1972, Michigan; J.D., 1979, Michigan. I appreciate the countless hours and
the excellent work of my research assistants, Elizabeth Lewis and Martina Rider.
1. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 604 (1982).
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 54, at
361 & n.21 (5th ed. 1984).
3. "[Ihe negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort but
the tort of negligence .... 6 B. WITKIN, SuMMARY OF CAL. LAw, Torts, § 838 (9th ed.
1988). "The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages ap-
ply. [ ]Whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law. Its existence
depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and upon a weighing of policy considera-
tions for and against imposition of liability." Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier
Serv., 209 Cal. Rptr. 189, 196 (1984), quoted with approval, Marlene F. v. Affiliated
Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 281 (Cal. 1989).
When courts limit recovery in NIED actions based on policy reasons, they are effec-
tively holding that the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a duty to protect the plain-
tiff from emotional harm.
4. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 54, at 360-61.
5. Id.; Julie A. Davies, Direct Action for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possi-
1283
tions, courts have carefully circumscribed liability for intangible emo-
tional distress injuries.6
NIED law in California has changed dramatically during the past
two decades. In 1968, in the landmark case Dillon v. Legg,7 Califor-
nia rejected the majority rule that strictly limited recovery in NIED
actions.8 California expanded recovery by allowing plaintiffs to re-
cover for NIED as long as their emotional distress injuries were rea-
sonably foreseeable.
In the twenty years following Dillon, California NIED cases were
confusing and inconsistent.9 In 1989, in response to these often con-
tradictory cases, the California Supreme Court reversed its trend to-
ward expansive liability and severely limited recovery in NIED
actions. In Thing v. La Chusa,O the California Supreme Court estab-
lished strict criteria that "bystanders"" must meet to recover for
NIED. These criteria prevent most bystanders from recovering emo-
tional distress damages. However, in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychi-
atric Medical Clinic, Inc.12 and Burgess v. Superior Court,13 the
California Supreme Court held that these prerequisites are limited to
"bystander" witnesses and do not apply to "direct" victims. 14 Direct
victims can recover in California in circumstances in which bystander
witnesses are barred from recovering.
This article examines the direct victim/bystander dichotomy. Part I
summarizes and critiques the development of the "direct victim" the-
ory. Part II analyzes the California appellate court opinions decided
after Thing and Marlene F that have discussed the direct victim/by-
stander distinction. Parts III and IV review the California Supreme
Court's most recent discussions of NIED in Christensen v. Superior
Court 15 and Burgess v. Superior Court.16 Part V recommends a new
approach to resolve the courts' inconsistent treatment of bystander
and direct victim NIED actions.
ble, 67 WASH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992). In addition, courts have been concerned about litigat-
ing trivial claims.
6. Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 207 (Cal. 1991) (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
7. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
8. Prior to Dillon, California had followed the more restrictive zone of danger
rule.
9. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823-24 (Cal. 1989).
10. Id. at 814.
11. A bystander is a person who suffers emotional distress as a result of witness-
ing a negligent defendant cause injury to a third party. Id at 815.
12. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
13. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
14. A direct victim is a person who has a preexisting relationship with a negligent
defendant. Id. at 1201.
15. 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
16. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
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PART I
HISTORY OF THE DIRECT VICTIM THEORY
A. Creation of the Dichotomy: Dillon and Molien
In Dillon v. Legg,17 the California Supreme Court rejected the
well-established rule that strictly limited recovery of emotional dis-
tress damages. It expanded recovery by holding that foreseeability of
the risk of emotional distress is of primary importance in establishing
the existence of a duty to bystanders in NIED actions.' 8 To deter-
mine whether emotional distress damages are reasonably foreseeable,
and thus whether a duty is owed, the court created three guidelines
for lower courts to consider:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contempo-
raneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were
closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the pres-
ence of only a distant relationship.
1 9
Twelve years later, in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 20 the
California Supreme Court complicated the law in this area. The
court apparently created a new "direct victim" class of plaintiffs and
held that the Dillon foreseeability guidelines did not apply to them.
2
'
In Molien, a doctor incorrectly diagnosed his patient's illness. The
doctor told his patient she contracted syphilis and directed her to in-
form her husband and have him tested for the disease. The court al-
lowed the husband to recover from the doctor for the emotional
distress he suffered as a result of the misdiagnosis. Although the
husband did not have any direct relationship or contact with the phy-
sician, the court held the husband could recover his emotional dis-
tress damages as a direct victim of the doctor's conduct. The court
allowed the husband to recover as a direct victim because his emo-
tional distress was foreseeable given the doctor's misdiagnosis of a
disease that is normally transmitted through sexual relations. 22
Although Molien allowed a direct victim to recover even though he
did not meet the Dillon guidelines, the Molien opinion provided little
direction for lower courts with respect to the direct victim/bystander
17. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
18. Id. at 919.
19. Id at 920.
20. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
21. Id at 816.
22. Id. at 817.
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distinction. "Molien neither established criteria for characterizing a
plaintiff as a 'direct' victim, nor explained the justification for per-
mitting 'direct' victims to recover when 'bystander' plaintiffs could
not."
2 3
In the years following Dillon and Molien, California bystander and
direct victim NIED cases were confusing and contradictory. The
lower courts failed to apply consistently the Dillon guidelines and
they had great difficulty differentiating direct victims from bystand-
ers.24 California's NIED law was so ambiguous that courts described
it as an "amorphous nether realm"25 and stated that the law con-
tained "murky waters."26
B. Continuation of the Nether Realm: Thing and Marlene F.
In 1989, the California Supreme Court attempted to resolve the in-
consistencies in NIED actions in Thing v. La Chusa27 and Marlene F.
v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.28 Although these cases
delineated clear rules regulating bystander cases, they failed to clar-
ify the murky waters surrounding direct victim actions.2 9
Thing v. La Chusa clarified the circumstances under which a by-
stander could recover for NIED.30 In Thing, the court turned the
Dillon foreseeability guidelines into doctrinal barriers when it estab-
lished three prerequisites to recovery for bystanders in NIED actions.
These prerequisites bar recovery for emotional distress unless the
plaintiff: "(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at
the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result
suffers serious emotional distress ... "31
The court based its holding in Thing on policy considerations that
the supreme court believed compelled it to place limitations on Cali-
fornia's trend toward unlimited liability.32 These policy considera-
23. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823 (Cal. 1989).
24. Id. at 823-24.
25. Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
26. Thing v. La Chusa, 231 Cal. Rptr. 439, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), superseded,
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). The supreme court believed the waters
were further muddied by post-Molien cases. Thing, 771 P.2d at 824.
27. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
28. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
29. The California Supreme Court clarified some of these inconsistencies in Bur-
gess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). See infra text accompanying notes
135-143.
30. In Thing, the mother of a young accident victim sued a negligent driver for the
emotional distress she suffered when she arrived on the scene moments after the acci-
dent occurred and she saw her bloody and unconscious child lying in the roadway.
Thing, 771 P.2d at 815.
31. Id. at 829-30 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 826-27.
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tions included the need to limit the potential for liability out of
proportion to culpability,33 the intangible nature of the loss,34 the in-
adequacy of monetary damages to make the loss whole,35 the diffi-
culty in measuring damages38 and the societal cost of attempting to
compensate the plaintiff.3 7 The court also criticized the unpredict-
able results of the Dillon foreseeability guidelines and indicated that
certainty and predictability needed to be returned to NIED cases. 38
The court concluded that "societal benefits of certainty in the law, as
well as traditional concepts of tort law, dictate limitation of by-
stander recovery of damages for emotional distress."39
In Thing, the court noted that the overwhelming majority of emo-
tional distress that members of our society endure is not compensa-
ble.40 Nevertheless, the court believed that certain NIED cases
should remain actionable. As a result, the court limited recovery to
plaintiffs who suffer severe emotional distress as a result of contem-
poraneously observing the defendant injure a close relative.41 Courts
can easily apply this bright line test. It also limits recovery in NIED
actions to plaintiffs who are most deserving of recovery. These plain-
tiffs have endured an "abnormal life experience" by witnessing an in-
jury to a close relative and are most likely to suffer the greatest
emotional harm.42
The same policy considerations that led the court to establish
bright line tests in bystander cases also apply to direct victim actions.
33. Id. at 826.
34. Id. at 828-29.
35. Id. at 827.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 826-27. Many of the policy considerations that suggest courts should
limit liability in NIED cases also suggest that courts should limit liability in other neg-
ligence actions as well, especially those in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for physi-
cal injury and emotional distress. However, when plaintiffs demonstrate clear physical
injuries, courts are more willing to compensate them for their additional emotional
distress damages.
38. Id. at 815.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 829.
41. In Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), a case that foreshadowed Thing
by seven months, the California Supreme Court held that cohabitants living in the
equivalent to a marriage relationship could not recover as bystanders because a cohabi-
tant relationship could not satisfy the "closely related" requirement. Id. at 586. The
court articulated three policy reasons to justify its holding: (1) the state's strong inter-
est in the marriage relationship; (2) judicial efficiency and economy; and (3) the need
to limit the class of persons to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty of care. Id. at
586-88.
42. Thing, 771 P.2d at 828 n.9 (quoting Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 5 n.6
(Cal. 1985)).
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However, in Marlene F,43 a case decided two weeks prior to Thing,
the California Supreme Court declined to apply the type of limita-
tions delineated in Thing-or other prerequisites to recovery-to di-
rect victim cases. Instead, the court expanded the "amorphous
nether realm" surrounding NIED actions by allowing plaintiffs who
did not meet the Thing prerequisites to recover based upon their spe-
cial relationship with the defendant. Marlene F continued to allow
direct victims to recover for NIED in circumstances in which by-
standers would be denied recovery. Unfortunately, the Marlene F
opinion failed to provide any guidelines to help the lower courts dif-
ferentiate between bystanders and direct victims.
In Marlene F, the court allowed two mothers to recover for NIED
from a therapist who sexually abused their children. The mothers
initially sought counseling for their children. However, the therapist
began treating the mothers as well as their sons because he believed
the children's psychological problems arose in part from difficulties
in the parent/child relationship. When the mothers learned that the
therapist had sexually abused their sons, they brought an action to
recover their emotional distress damages. The court did not allow
the mothers to recover as bystanders because they were not
percipient witnesses to the injury causing event. However, it held the
mothers could recover because of their "special relationship" with
the therapist.
The Marlene F opinion contained a lengthy discussion of the
Molien direct victim theory and concluded that the therapist directed
his tortious conduct against the mothers as well as their sons.44 How-
ever, the court never explained how the Molien direct victim rule
justified recovery in Marlene F In Molien, the doctor directed his
tortious conduct (misdiagnosing a disease) at the husband because the
doctor told his patient to convey the misdiagnosis to her husband and
have him tested. In contrast, in Marlene F, the therapist directed
the tortious conduct (sexually abusing the children) at the children
and not at the mothers. In fact, the therapist presumably sought to
hide the tortious conduct from the mothers. Despite these clear dif-
ferences in the facts, the majority opinion failed to explain how the
direct victim theory established in Molien supported the mothers'
right to recover in Marlene F
Although the Marlene F opinion stated a clear rule controlling re-
covery in NIED actions, it failed to explain how that rule applied to
the mothers who brought the suit. According to the supreme court,
"[d]amages for severe emotional distress ... are recoverable in a neg-
ligence action when they result from the breach of a duty owed the
43. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
44. Id. at 283.
1288
[Vol. 19: 1283, 1992] Emotional Distress Tort Recovery
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
plaintiff that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defend-
ant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between
the two."45 In Marlene F., the majority opinion classified Molien as a
case in which the defendant assumed a duty to convey accurate infor-
mation to the husband. Because the doctor breached his assumed
duty, the court concluded the husband was a direct victim of the doc-
tor's negligence.46 However, the Marlene F majority opinion did not
explain how the therapist's duty to the mothers arose. It did not in-
dicate whether the therapist assumed a duty to them, whether the
duty was imposed by law, or whether it arose out of the therapeutic
relationship.
The Marlene F opinion complicated rather than clarified the direct
victim theory. After Marlene F, the lower courts had no clear guide-
lines or criteria to determine what type of contact or relationship
with a defendant qualifies the plaintiff as a direct victim rather than
a bystander.
The ambiguities in the Marlene F opinion were due primarily to
underlying differences among the justices about the meaning and via-
bility of the direct victim theory. The Marlene F majority opinion
and Justice Eagleson's concurring opinion exposed the sharp disa-
greement among the justices regarding the circumstances in which
the direct victim doctrine should apply and whether the direct vic-
tim/bystander dichotomy should even exist.
The three concurring justices believed the majority's reliance on a
direct victim analysis was irrelevant. Instead, they concluded that
the therapist's professional malpractice entitled the mothers to re-
cover. The concurring justices emphasized that the mothers were pa-
tients of the therapist and the therapist owed them a duty "to refrain
from conduct that foreseeably may aggravate the condition for which
treatment was sought or inhibit the therapist's ability to successfully
treat the patient."47 The concurring justices concluded that the sex-
ual abuse of the children violated the therapist's professional duty.
In a sharp criticism of the majority opinion, the concurring opinion
stated:
I do not, however, agree that a "direct victim" theory of liability or Molien has
any relevance to the plaintiffs' right to recover.... As the majority recognize,
Molien did not establish an independent cause of action for infliction of seri-
ous emotional distress. Since there was no breach of a professional relation-
ship between the defendant and the plaintiff, the justification for permitting
45. Id. at 282.
46. 1&
47. Id. at 288 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
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recovery in that case was the defendant's assumption of a duty to the plaintiff
when he directed that his diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease be com-
municated to plaintiff .... The majority's reliance on Molien in this case, and
its suggestion that permitting recovery is somehow novel although not a "dra-
matic step" are inexplicable. The explanation in Molien that the plaintiff was
a "direct victim" did no more than distinguish and explain why the Molien
plaintiff had not stated a cause of action as a "bystander" victim whose emo-
tional distress injury was caused by observation of an injury to another.48
The justices' sharp disagreement about the meaning and signifi-
cance of the direct victim theory is also apparent from the opinions in
Thing v. La Chusa.49 Thing exemplifies a classic bystander witness
case in which a mother arrived on the scene of an accident moments
after a negligent driver caused severe injuries to her young son.
Although the direct victim theory had no relevance to the court's
holding in Thing, the majority opinion, authored by Justice Eagleson,
again criticized Molien as a case which "neither established criteria
for characterizing a plaintiff as a 'direct' victim, nor explained the
justification for permitting 'direct' victims to recover when 'by-
stander' plaintiffs could not."50 The opinion also noted that "[t]he
subtleties in the distinction between the right to recover as a 'by-
stander' and as a 'direct victim'.., have contributed in some measure
to the present difficulty in defining the scope of an NIED action."5 '
Justice Mosk, the author of Molien, indicated in his dissenting
opinion in Thing that he believed the "majority fail[ed] to understand
Molien."52 He could not understand why "the majority seem[ed] to
have some trouble with Molien limiting recovery to the 'direct victim'
of the doctor's negligence .... The court [in Molien] made it abun-
dantly clear that 'the alleged tortious conduct of defendant was di-
rected to [the husband] as well as to his wife.' Thus, both were direct
victims." 53
The language in the Thing majority and dissenting opinions is even
more confusing given that both opinions make absolutely no refer-
ence to Marlene F, a case that the supreme court decided two weeks
prior to Thing and that clearly relied upon the direct victim theory.
Instead of clarifying the direct victim rules, the opinions in Marlene
F and Thing created confusion in the lower courts about whether the
California Supreme Court approved the direct victim/bystander di-
chotomy. For example, in Schwarz v. Regents of the University of
California,54 the Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the
supreme court's opinion in Thing and stated: "[T]he Supreme Court
48. 1& at 288-89 (Eagleson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
49. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
50. Id. at 823.
51. Id
52. Id. at 837 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
54. 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
1290
[Vol. 19: 1283, 1992] Emotional Distress Tort Recovery
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
intends to dismantle entirely the 'direct victim' distinction."55 De-
spite this perceived rejection of the direct victim/bystander dichot-
omy, based upon Marlene F., the Second District ultimately
concluded: "As matters stand now, we deem it wise to assume a 'di-
rect victim' theory, as illuminated and limited by Marlene F. and
Ochoa v. Superior Court,56 remains viable."57
PART II
APPELLATE COURT INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THING AND MARLENE F.
After the California Supreme Court's holdings in Marlene F and
Thing, the appellate courts consistently denied recovery in NIED
cases to nonpercipient witnesses who failed to claim direct victim sta-
tus.5 8 Because the Thing requirements were clearly stated and easily
applied, the appellate courts were able to consistently resolve most of
the bystander witness cases.5 9
However, problems remained in cases in which plaintiffs alleged
they were entitled to relief under a direct victim theory. Many ap-
pellate courts denied recovery to plaintiffs who claimed direct victim
status because of the policy reasons for limiting relief in NIED ac-
tions that the California Supreme Court discussed in Thing.60 In con-
trast, other courts allowed plaintiffs to recover based on a direct
victim theory.6 ' The holdings and reasoning in these cases indicate
55. Id. at 476.
56. In Ochoa, a minor died due to negligent medical treatment that the mother
had observed. The mother was allowed to recover as a percipient witness under Dil-
Ion, but the court held she was not a direct victim of the doctor's negligence. The
supreme court held the mother was not a direct victim because the doctor's negligence
was "directed primarily at the decedent." Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal.
1985).
57. Schwarz, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., Fife v. Astenius, 284 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Ortiz v. HPM
Corp., 285 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Breazeal v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memo-
rial Hosp., 286 Cal. Rptr. 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
59. Some minor areas of bystander witness cases still require further clarification.
See, e.g., Wilks v. Hom, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) and In re: Air Crash
Disaster Near Cerritos, California, No. 91-55464, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5863 (9th Cir.
1992), amended, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 17951 (9th Cir. 1992). These cases focused on the
contemporaneous observation requirement.
60. See, e.g., Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Golstein v.
Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Schwarz v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
61. See, e.g., Christensen v. Superior Court, 271 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),
superseded, 810 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991); Anisodon v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Center, 285
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that Thing and Marlene F. failed to clarify the "amorphous nether
realm" that existed in NIED direct victim cases.
In determining whether to grant relief in the direct victim cases,
the appellate courts focused primarily on four different factors: (1)
the foreseeability of the emotional distress damages; (2) the person at
whom the defendant's conduct was directed; (3) the existence of a
contract; and (4) the nature of the services the defendant provided.
A. Foreseeability of Emotional Distress Damages
Although Thing generally rejected foreseeability as an appropriate
limiting factor in bystander cases, the court, in Quesada v. Oak Hill
Improvement Company,62 focused on the foreseeability of the risk of
emotional distress damages and granted recovery.63 In Quesada, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal allowed a sister and niece to recover
from a funeral home for "negligent mishandling of a corpse."6 4 The
plaintiffs sued the funeral home after the home received the wrong
body from the county coroner and buried it over the protestations of
the decedent's relatives. Although the sister and niece did not have a
duty to dispose of the decedent's remains and were not parties to the
funeral home contract, they claimed that they were the foreseeable
direct victims of the negligent mishandling of the corpse.65 The court
allowed the plaintiffs to recover based upon the foreseeability of
their emotional distress damages. The court never specifically ana-
lyzed whether these plaintiffs should recover as direct victims or by-
stander witnesses; it merely stated that they could recover because
their emotional distress was foreseeable.
In contrast to Quesada, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991) review dis-
missed, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4220 (Cal. 1992); Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 261
Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
62. 261 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
63. In addition, in Ballinger v. Palm Springs Aerial Tramway, 269 Cal. Rptr. 583
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), review denied and opinion withdrawn by order of court, 1990 Cal.
LEXIS 4503 (Cal. 1990), the court also focused on the foreseeability of the risk and al-
lowed recovery. In Ballinger, passengers on the descending trip of the Palm Springs
tramway sued for NIED when a portion of the tram fell through the roof and hit one
of the passengers who subsequently died. The court allowed plaintiffs, who had not
suffered any physical injury and were not related to the injured passenger, to recover
as direct victims because their emotional distress damages were foreseeable. The court
held: "It was reasonably foreseeable that even those passengers who were not physi-
cally hit by pieces of glass and were not physically injured would suffer severe emo-
tional distress from the experience. Thus, plaintiffs qualify as 'direct victims' under
the Molien rationale." Id. at 589.
64. The negligent mishandling of human remains is not a separate tort; it is conve-
nient terminology descriptive of the context in which the negligence occurred. Chris-
tensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 188-89 (Cal. 1991). The tort with which the
court is concerned is negligence. Just like NIED, it requires the same elements as a
negligence action: duty, breach, causation and damages.
65. Quesada, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
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that foreseeability of emotional distress injury was not a sufficient
basis for imposing liability. In Holliday v. Jones,66 a trial court had
previously convicted Holliday of involuntary manslaughter in connec-
tion with his wife's death. After the appellate court reversed his con-
viction because of the incompetence of his first attorney, he was
retried and acquitted. Subsequently, Holliday's children sued their
father's first attorney for NIED.67 Based upon Molien, the trial court
awarded damages to the children as foreseeable victims.68 The appel-
late court reversed the trial court. Although the appellate court
agreed that the children were foreseeable victims, the court held the
defendant had no duty to protect the children from emotional harm.
The Holliday court stated:
It would appear that in order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress damages, a plaintiff must either have a special relationship to the de-
fendant (Marlene F.), be the direct object of some aspect of the defendant's
conduct (Molien) or personally witness a negligently caused physical injury to
a closely related primary victim (Dillon; Ochoa; Thing).6 9
The court denied recovery to the children because they failed to fit
into any of the three categories: they could not recover based on a
special relationship because they had no contractual or other rela-
tionship with the attorney; they could not recover as direct victims
because the attorney's malpractice was not "directed" at them; and
they could not recover as bystanders because they did not witness
any physical injury to their father.70 According to the Holliday
court, direct victim status could not be based solely on whether the
emotional distress damages were foreseeable.71
B. Conduct Directed at the Plaintiff
Five lower court cases72 focused on the language in Molien that
66. 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
67. The father in Holliday also sued to recover his emotional distress damages.
The court allowed the father to recover because it found a fundamental personal right,
his liberty, was at stake and emotional distress damages necessarily result from loss of
liberty. Id. at 456.
68. Id. at 449.
69. Id. at 453.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See also Ballinger v. Palm Springs Aerial Tramway, 269 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review denied and opinion withdrawn by order of court, 1990 Cal.
LEXIS 4503 (Cal. 1990). In Ballinger, the court allowed recovery because it found the
defendant's conduct was directed at the tram passengers. The court did not explain
how the negligent failure to maintain a tramway in proper working order is "by its
very nature" directed at the passengers who were not struck.
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found the defendant liable to the husband because "the alleged tor-
tious conduct of defendant was directed to him as well as the wife."73
Because Molien did not explain how to determine whether conduct is
directed at a particular plaintiff, these cases appear inconsistent.
In Martin v. United States of America,74 a mother asserted she was
entitled to recover as a direct victim because of a child care center's
agreement to care for her child. In Martin, a child was kidnapped
and raped while she was in the care of a day care center. The mother
asserted she was entitled to recover as a direct victim based upon the
special relationship between a parent and a day care provider. This
special relationship claim was based on the unique nature of a day
care center's standing in loco parentis.7 5 Although the court found
the mother's claim compelling, it denied her recovery as a direct vic-
tim. The court based its holding on the policy reasons expressed in
Thing for limiting liability and promoting certainty in the law. The
court held that the negligent supervision of the child was conduct
"directed at" the child and not at the mother.
Similarly, in Schwarz v. Regents of the University of California,76
the court rejected a father's claim that he should recover as a direct
victim or based on a special relationship. The father brought suit
against his son's psychotherapist when the boy's mother moved the
son to another country based on the therapist's advice. After analyz-
ing the court's reasoning in Thing and Marlene F., the Schwarz appel-
late court held that the father could not recover as a bystander 77 or
as a direct victim.7 8 The court denied recovery to him as a direct vic-
tim because it found that the therapist's services were rendered pri-
marily to benefit the son and any benefit to the father was secondary.
The facts in Schwarz were very similar to those of Marlene F. In
both cases, parents sued their children's therapists. In denying recov-
ery to the father, the Schwarz court distinguished Marlene F and
held that Marlene F should be limited to its specific circumstances.
In Marlene F., the therapist treated the mothers as well as the sons
in the context of the family relationship; additionally, the mothers al-
leged that the therapist's sexual misconduct disrupted the family re-
lationship. Although the therapist's conduct in Schwarz also
disrupted the family relationship, the Schwarz court distinguished
Marlene F because of the differing therapeutic goals. In Schwarz,
73. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980).
74. 779 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
75. Id at 1248.
76. 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
77. He could not recover as a bystander because he did not observe the alleged in-
jury-producing event (the encouragement of and failure to take any steps to stop the
mother from implementing her plan to remove the son from the country and conceal
his whereabouts). ld. at 476.
78. Id at 483.
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the therapist directed the therapy at treating the son, while in Mar-
lene F, a major goal of the therapy was to ameliorate the family dys-
function in general. Therefore, the Schwarz court concluded: "The
clear implication is that the court would not have viewed the [Mar-
lene F] mothers as 'direct victims' had the therapist treated the sons
only for the purpose of resolving the sons' individual emotional
problems, even if these problems led to family difficulties, rather
than treating the parent-child family problems themselves." 79
In contrast to Schwarz, in Jacoves v. United Merchandising
Corp.,80 the appellate court held that a triable issue of fact existed as
to whether parents could qualify as direct victims of their son's negli-
gent psychiatric hospital treatment. In Jacoves, parents sued a hospi-
tal for NIED after their son committed suicide. The parents alleged
that the hospital was negligent when it released the son. Although
the son was the defendant's primary patient, the parents alleged they
were entitled to recover because they were the intended beneficiaries
of the group therapy, they were treated as patients in family therapy
sessions and they were utilized as active instrumentalities in their
son's treatment.81 Although Jacoves was factually similar to
Schwarz, the Jacoves court did not dismiss the parents' claim. It con-
cluded that whether the hospital owed the parents a direct duty was
at least a triable issue of fact.
Another California appellate court opinion, Anisodon v. Superior
Court of San Diego County,82 also involved questions concerning a
family unit receiving treatment. In Anisodon, the court addressed
whether a mother and father could recover as direct victims from
doctors who made an improper uterine incision during a cesarean
section. The improper incision ultimately led to serious physical inju-
ries to the child. The mother alleged that she should recover her
emotional distress damages as a victim of medical malpractice be-
cause she received an improper incision. The improper incision al-
lowed the mother to allege that the incision, "along with the
condition of her daughter," caused her severe emotional distress. Be-
cause the mother received the improper incision, the court found that
the doctors directed the negligent medical care at both the mother
and the child and the mother could recover as a direct victim.
79. Id. at 477-78.
80. B052163, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
81. Id. at *15.
82. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991),
review dismissed, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4220 (Cal. 1992).
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The court analogized the mother's situation during the delivery to
the mothers' situation in Marlene F.:
[Tihe [Marlene F.] mothers were treated as part of a family unit, whose indi-
vidual interests were unavoidably harmed when another member of the fam-
fly was harmed in the course of the joint treatment.
We believe a principled reading of the authority, particularly Marlene F., re-
quires us to conclude that Mother, under these circumstances of labor and de-
livery, was part of a family unit which received joint treatment, such that
medical negligence directed at herself and her infant during the birth process
may be pled to have caused harm to the mother's individual interests.8 3 ,
The court denied recovery to the father because it found that he
was not a direct object of the negligent medical care. The court
stated:
[W]e can only conclude that in no sense was the allegedly negligent medical
care "by its very nature" directed at him. He was not required to take further
action with regard to examination of his person, as was Mr. Molien. He was
not a patient, nor for the specialized purposes of the theory enunciated in
Marlene F., a member of the family unit that was undergoing joint treatment
.... While Father's emotional distress from these sad facts is unquestionably
as real and as deep as is that of the child's mother, Father simply does not
qualify as a patient in joint treatment to whom particular duties were owed.8 4
In Burger v. Pond,85 the fianc6e of an attorney's client sued for
NIED as a direct victim of the attorney's negligence because she was
an intended beneficiary of the attorney's services. The attorney at-
tempted to obtain a divorce for his client so the client could marry
the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserted that as a result of her "direct con-
tact" with the attorney, a "special relationship" existed which created
a duty of care.86 The court held that she was not a direct victim
under Molien because the attorney had not directed any conduct to-
ward her. Although the plaintiff had direct contact with the attorney
and the attorney knew of the plaintiff's concerns, the court held that
these facts did not support her claim of a special relationship or di-
rect victim status. 87
C Existence of a Contractual Relationship
Prior to Marlene F, two cases, Andalon v. Superior Court88 and
Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,8 9 allowed parents to recover
as Molien direct victims based on defendants' contractual obligations
to care for the plaintiffs' children. In contrast, Martinez v. County of
Los Angeles,90 another pre-Marlene F case, held that a contract for
83. Id. at 546.
84. Id at 547 (citation omitted).
85. 273 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
86. Id at 713.
87. Id. at 717.
88. 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
89. 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
90. 231 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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delivery and care of a child does not entitle the parents to recover as
direct victims.
In Marlene F., the California Supreme Court did not consider
whether a duty can be premised solely on the existence of a contract.
It limited its discussion of the issue to a footnote and stated: "[Tlhe
existence of a contract to provide care for the children bolsters the
mothers' showing that the therapist also owed them a duty of care,
but their claim does not rest solely, or even necessarily, on that con-
tract."9 1  The post-Marlene F. appellate cases that considered
whether a contractual relationship could lead to recovery under a di-
rect victim theory either rejected a contract-based duty or did not re-
solve the issue because the plaintiffs were entitled to recover based
on other aspects of their relationship with the defendants.92
Like Marlene F, the courts in Anisodon v. Mercy Hospital and
Medical Center 93 and Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp.94 did
not analyze the impact of the contractual relationship. In Anisodon,
the court found it unnecessary to "rely on the two other characteriza-
tions made in Mother's pleading of the doctor/patient relationship as
contractual or 'special.'"95 Instead, it found the alleged contractual
relationship merely "bolster[ed]" the showing of a duty.96 In Jacoves,
the court dismissed in a footnote the parents' claim that they were
intended beneficiaries of their son's admission contract with a hospi-
tal. The court found the parents' claim did not depend on the con-
tract relationship.97
In Golstein v. Superior Court,98 parents of a nine-year-old who died
as a result of a negligent administration of an overdose of radiation
91. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 283 n.7
(Cal. 1989).
92. See also Saari v. Jongordon Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). In
Saari, the plaintiff and his longtime companion entered into a contract with a cremato-
rium to cremate the companion's body and return the ashes to the plaintiff. When the
crematorium failed to comply with the contract terms, the plaintiff sued to recover his
emotional distress damages. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover his emotional
distress damages based upon the crematorium's breach of the contract. The court did
not determine whether the contract affected the plaintiff's NIED action because it
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover his emotional distress damages in
his breach of contract cause of action. Id at 86.
93. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991),
review dismissed, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4220 (Cal. 1992).
94. B052163, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
95. Anisodon, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
96. i,
97. Jacoves, at *15 n.12.
98. 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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also sought recovery for their emotional distress based upon their
contract with the doctor. The court rejected the parents' claim that
the contract created a duty. However, the Golstein opinion contained
little analysis regarding whether the contractual relationship should
give rise to a duty of care. Instead, the court mentioned Newton 99
and Andalon,100 the two cases that preceded Marlene F. and allowed
recovery based upon a contractual relationship. It then denied recov-
ery because it incorrectly concluded that Marlene F declined to fol-
low these cases.
D. Uniqueness of the Services the Defendant Is Providing
Two appellate cases allowed recovery based upon the unique na-
ture of the services the defendant was providing. In Quesada v. Oak
Hill Improvement CompanylO1 and COristensen v. Superior Court,102
the appellate courts permitted decedents' relatives to recover from
mortuaries and crematoriums for the mishandling of human remains
because of the unique services that the defendants provided.103
Although the relatives appeared to be bystander victims who should
have been denied recovery because they were not percipient wit-
nesses to the injury-producing event, these courts allowed recovery.
In Christensen, the defendants mishandled the remains of approxi-
mately 16,000 decedents and removed organs from approximately one
thousand decedents. Defendants allegedly "mutilated decedents' re-
mains by removing and 'harvesting' organs and body parts; per-
formed multiple cremations; . . . commingled decedents cremated
remains with those of other decedents, and with nonhuman residue;
extracted gold and other metals from decedents' remains; [and] mis-
appropriated decedents' valuables and personal effects."l 0 4 The mis-
handling occurred over a seven-year period and the plaintiffs learned
of the defendants' conduct from a media broadcast.
The plaintiffs sued for NIEDlO5 and the appellate court concluded
that the plaintiffs could recover because they fit within the Marlene
99. 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
100. 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
101. 261 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
102. 271 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), superseded, 820 P.2d 181 (1991). The
supreme court also treated the mishandling of dead bodies as sui generis. See infra
text accompanying notes 112-118.
103. Many jurisdictions have allowed recovery in negligent handling of corpse cases
without imposing strict prerequisites to recovery. The jurisdictions that allow recovery
in these cases base their holdings on the likelihood of genuine and serious mental dis-
tress which arises when a loved one's corpse has been mishandled. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 54, at 362.
104. Ctristensen, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
105. Plaintiffs also sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress and other
statutory and tort causes of action that are not relevant to this discussion.
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F. "special relationship category."106 The special relationship in
Christensen arose from the defendants' agreement to care for a dece-
dentlo7 and was based on the premise that human remains symbolize
"a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may, from family or friend-
ship, have an interest in [them]." 08
The court rejected the defendants' claim that Thing requires the
plaintiffs' presence at the mishandling to recover for NIED. The
Christensen court distinguished its facts from those in Thing because
it found that the Christensen plaintiffs had a special relationship
with the defendants that entitled them to recover. The court found a
special relationship existed even though the Christensen plaintiffs
were not parties to a contract with the defendants. This special rela-
tionship existed between the defendants and all close relatives of the
decedents and allegedly arose from the defendants' acceptance of the
decedents' bodies for burial.
The appellate courts treated the cases involving the mishandling of
human remains as sui generis. The Christensen court acknowledged
that its ruling allowed recovery for mishandling remains when it
would deny recovery if the defendants had injured a living person.l0 9
It justified the unique treatment by borrowing a phrase from death
penalty litigation: "Death is qualitatively different."110
As noted above, appellate courts continued to struggle with NIED
actions after Marlene F. and Thing. These supreme court opinions
failed to provide clear guidelines for lower courts to determine
whether a plaintiff qualifies as a direct victim. The "amorphous
nether realm" created in Dillon and Molien continued because Mar-
lene F. and Thing complicated rather than clarified the direct victim
rules. The California Supreme Court had another opportunity to re-
solve these difficulties by establishing clear guidelines when it de-
cided Christensen,"' but it failed to do so.
106. Id at 374.
107. Id
108. Id (quoting Huntly v. Zurich General A. & L. Ins. Co., 280 P. 163, 166 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1929)).
109. A "mortuary may be liable for negligently mishandling human remains
although the same mortuary would not have been liable to absent family members if
the mortuary's driver had negligently caused the decedent's death." Id at 376.
110. Id. (quoting People v. Hernandez, 763 P.2d 1289, 1318 (Cal. 1988)).
111. Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
1299
PART III
CHRISTENSEN V. SUPERIOR COURT
When the California Supreme Court decided Christensen, it appar-
ently approved the appellate court's treatment of "dead body cases"
as sui generis. The California Supreme Court allowed family mem-
bers of the decedent to recover for NIED but modified the appellate
court's determination of the protected class." 2 The California
Supreme Court allowed individuals who had no statutory right to
control the disposition of the decedent's remains and no contractual
relationship with the defendants to recover. The only limitations to
recovery were that the plaintiffs must be close family members, must
be aware that funeral and/or crematory services were being per-
formed, and must be the persons for whom the funeral/crematory
services were being performed.113
The court held the Thing limitations on bystander recovery did not
apply to the Christensen plaintiffs because those limitations applied
only to the bystander-witness scenario and not to the mishandling of
human remains." 4 It limited the Thing prerequisites to cases involv-
ing "negligent conduct of a defendant with whom the plaintiff had no
preexisting relationship, and to whom the defendant had not previ-
ously assumed a duty of care beyond that owed to the public in gen-
eral.'11s  The court reasoned that the general principles underlying
tort law do "not compel a conclusion that the limitations deemed ap-
propriate in Dillon v. Legg and Thing v. La Clusa to limit recovery
by bystanders should apply in other situations, and particularly in
that presented here. [ ]The unique context in which this dispute
arises is relevant to its resolution."116
The Christensen court reiterated the three circumstances that es-
tablish a duty of care in NIED actions: (1) defendant's assumption of
a duty; (2) imposition of a duty as a matter of law; or (3) imposition
of a duty based upon a special relationship."7 The California
Supreme Court held the Christensen defendants liable because they:
assumed a duty to the close relatives of the decedents for whose benefit they
were to provide funeral and/or related services. They thereby created a spe-
cial relationship obligating them to perform those services in the dignified and
respectful manner the bereaved expect of mortuary and crematory operators.
112. Id, at 183.
113. I& at 199. The court did not specify who was included in the class of persons
for whom the defendant performed the services. It excluded from the class infants
and those who were not born at the time the defendant rendered the services. The
court concluded that the defendant would not owe a duty to infants and the unborn
because they are not foreseeable victims. Beyond excluding this group, the court did
not further define this class.
114. I& at 190.
115. I& at 189.
116. Id, at 190 (emphasis added).
117. I. at 193.
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The existence of this duty distinguishes the negligence action pleaded here
from those of the bystander-witnesses who were plaintiffs in Thing v. La
Chusa and Dillon v. Legg.118
The Christensen defendants can be distinguished from the Thing
and Dillon defendants because the defendants in these later cases
had no prior contact with either the plaintiff or anyone closely re-
lated to the plaintiff. However, the court failed to distinguish the
Christensen defendants from the defendants in Ochoa,ii9 Golstein,120
Anisodon,121 Holliday,122 Burger,123 Martin, 24 or Schwarz.125 In
each of these cases, the defendant had prior contact with the plaintiff
or with the plaintiff's close relative. Unless one accepts the premise
that "death is qualitatively different," the court's conclusion that
mortuary defendants assume a duty to close family members appears
inconsistent with its conclusion that no duty is assumed to close rela-
tives when a doctor treats a close relative's medical needs, when a
therapist counsels a close relative, or when an attorney provides legal
services to a close relative.
The court also used the contract with the mortuary as a basis to
impose a duty.126 The court referred to cases in which plaintiffs who
were not in privity of contract with the defendant could recover as
third party beneficiaries of the contract. The court found liability
based upon the contract because in Christensen the contract was in-
tended to benefit the plaintiffs and the damages were foreseeable. 27
Although the California Supreme Court concluded that the exist-
ence of the contract and the assumption of the duty should lead to
liability in the unique context of mishandling human remains, it
failed to identify which other contractual relationships give rise to a
duty of care. It also failed to explain the relationship between as-
sumed duty, direct victim, and special relationship status. Instead,
the court held that liability was appropriate in Christensen because
the unique context of mishandling human remains satisfies the policy
reasons that determine whether a duty should be imposed. These
118. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
119. 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
120. 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
121. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991),
review dismissed, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4220 (Cal. 1992).
122. 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
123. 273 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
124. 779 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
125. 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
126. Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 194 (Cal. 1991).
127. Id.
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policy reasons include: (1) the foreseeability and certainty of injury
in funeral-related services; 2 8 (2) the moral blame attached to engag-
ing in purposefully mishandling human remains;129 (3) the relatively
light burden to the community because of the limited potential class
of plaintiffs;130 and (4) the imposition of liability that is proportionate
to the defendant's culpability.131
As Justice Kennard's concurring and dissenting opinion in Chris-
tensen indicates, the weighing of the above policy reasons is inconsis-
tent with the California Supreme Court's prior decisions. Although
defendants can clearly foresee emotional distress damages if they
mishandle a loved one's remains, foreseeability fails as a useful guide-
line or a meaningful restriction on the scope of an NIED action. 132
For example, parents who learn that their child has been perma-
nently disabled by an automobile accident or as a result of a negli-
gently performed medical procedure also suffer foreseeable
emotional distress, but they are denied recovery unless they are
percipient witnesses who meet the Thing requirements. 3 3 Further-
more, mishandling of human remains is no more blameworthy than
driving at high speeds while intoxicated at the risk of death to high-
way users.134
In Christensen, as in Marlene F., the court allowed recovery with-
out articulating clear guidelines for the appellate courts to apply.
The court concluded that the defendants' assumption of a duty led to
a special relationship which led to an imposition of liability. How-
ever, it did not explain why a mortician burying or cremating a body
has assumed a duty to all close relatives who are aware the services
are being provided while a therapist or doctor treating a minor child
has not assumed a duty to the child's parents.
PART IV
BURGESS V. SUPERIOR COURT
The California Supreme Court modified and explained the direct
victim theory of recovery in its most recent decision, Burgess v. Supe-
rior Court.135 In Burgess, the court allowed a mother to recover from
a physician whose negligence during delivery caused physical injury
to the child. The court concluded that the mother was a direct victim
of the doctor's negligence because the physician committed malprac-
128. Id, at 196.
129. Id. at 197.
130. Id. at 198.
131. Id at 199.
132. Id at 206 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. at 212.
134. Id
135. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
1302
[Vol. 19: 1283, 1992] Emotional Distress Tort Recovery
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tice during his treatment of the mother. As a result, the mother was
entitled to recover her emotional distress damages.
Although the court allowed the mother to recover for NIED, the
court limited her damages. The mother could recover for the distress
she suffered as a result of participating in the "abnormal event" of a
negligent delivery and reacting to the unexpected outcome of her
pregnancy. 3 6 However, she could not recover for the emotional dis-
tress she suffered as a result of the loss of her child's consortium.1
37
Furthermore, in dicta, the court indicated that fathers generally
would be denied recovery in negligent delivery actions unless they
meet the Thing prerequisites to bystander recovery.138 According to
the court, fathers in negligent delivery actions are not entitled to re-
cover as direct victims because they generally cannot establish the
requisite physician-patient relationship. 139
The Burgess majority opinion 140 modified the direct victim rule by
limiting Molien to its facts. The majority opinion criticized the direct
victim designation for its tendency to "obscure, rather than illumi-
nate"'141 the relevant analysis in NIED actions. It focused its criti-
cism of Molien on the "perception that Molien introduced a new
method for determining the existence of a duty, limited only by the
concept of foreseeability."'142 The court held:
To the extent that Molien stands for this proposition, it should not be relied
upon and its discussion of duty is limited to its facts. As recognized in Thing,
"[lit is clear that foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful 'guideline' or
a meaningful restriction on the scope of [an action for damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress.]"'1 4 3
The court attempted to clarify the underlying rationale for the di-
rect victim theory by limiting the direct victim classification to plain-
tiffs who are owed a duty based upon a preexisting relationship.
According to the court, the existence of this preexisting relationship
136. Id, at 1209.
137. Parents may not recover damages for loss of filial consortium in California.
Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977).
138. The California Supreme Court did not resolve a father's right to recover be-
cause the father in Burgess was dismissed during the discovery proceedings. Burgess,
831 P.2d at 1209.
139. Id. at 1204 n.8.
140. Six of the seven justices joined the majority opinion. Justice Mosk concurred
in the result but did not join the majority. He found the majority's criticism of Molien
an "uncalled for" criticism and its reliance on its own "aberrational" Thing majority
opinion "arrogant". Id. at 1210 (Mosk, J., concurring).
141. Id at 1200.
142. Id. at 1201.
143. Id.
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distinguishes a direct victim from a bystander.144
The court cited Christensen and Marlene F to support its holding
that plaintiffs qualify as direct victims if they can establish a negli-
gent breach of a duty based upon a preexisting relationship.145 The
plaintiffs in Marlene F clearly had a preexisting relationship because
of their status as patients of the therapist. Similarly, the mother in
Burgess had a preexisting physician-patient relationship. The plain-
tiffs' preexisting relationship in Christensen is not as clear. In Chris-
tensen, many of the plaintiffs did not have any prior contact or
relationship with the defendants. Nevertheless, the court based the
plaintiffs' direct victim status on the defendants' assumption of a
duty. According to the court's opinion in Christensen, the defend-
ants' assumption of a duty created a special relationship that estab-
lished the plaintiffs' direct victim status. However, Christensen,
Marlene F, and Burgess do not provide guidelines to determine the
circumstances under which a defendant has assumed a duty. In addi-
tion, the court has not explained why morticians have assumed a
duty to a decedent's close relatives while physicians, therapists and
lawyers have not assumed a duty to their clients' close relatives.
The court's direct victim designation also fails to limit direct victim
status to appropriate preexisting relationships. Not all plaintiffs with
preexisting relationships are entitled to recover for NIED. For ex-
ample, breach of duty in a legal malpractice case does not generally
lead to recovery of emotional distress damages.146
Burgess appears to be a continuation of the court's tendency to
treat each NIED case as sui generis. The court imposed a duty in
Marlene F and Burgess because the plaintiffs' preexisting special re-
lationships established their status as direct victims. It imposed a
duty in Christensen because the unique nature of the services the
mortuary provided led to an assumed duty and direct victim status.
These decisions do not provide a comprehensive theory that lower
courts can use in future factually dissimilar cases. To ensure that
lower courts will consistently resolve future cases, the court must de-
velop a comprehensive theory that delineates the circumstances
under which plaintiffs are entitled to recover for NIED.
As one appellate court recently noted:
Nowhere is the application of duty principles more heterodox than in the as-
semblage of cases pertaining to recovery for emotional distress. The effort to
force disparate cases with loose family resemblance into a tight, coherent con-
ceptual scheme has bedeviled this area of decisional law.1 4 7
Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court's most recent decisions
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Merenda v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
147. Id. at 90.
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fail to provide the coherent, comprehensive framework that the
lower courts need to rationally and consistently decide NIED actions.
Until the California Supreme Court provides such a framework, the
lower courts will continue to struggle to determine the circumstances
under which a defendant has assumed a duty and the types of rela-
tionships that justify the imposition of liability for NIED.
PART V
SOLUTION
Regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional dis-
tress damages as a bystander or as a direct victim, the issue underly-
ing every liability determination is whether the law imposes a duty
on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from emotional harm. In by-
stander cases, the California Supreme Court clearly identified the
policy reasons that led it to strictly limit the class of bystander plain-
tiffs to whom defendants owe a duty.148 The court adopted a bright
line test: (1) to insulate society from the tremendous costs that would
be incurred if it allowed expansive liability; (2) to limit defendants'
exposure to liability to an amount in proportion to their culpability;
and (3) to promote certainty in the law, as well as judicial efficiency
and economy. The court also stressed the unique nature of emotional
distress injuries: they involve intangible losses, courts have difficulty
quantifying them, and monetary damages do not adequately compen-
sate victims.149
These policy concerns, which justified limiting the class of plain-
tiffs to whom a defendant owed a duty in NIED bystander witness
cases, are equally applicable in other NIED actions. However, the
court ignored these policy considerations in Marlene F., Christensen,
and Burgess when it failed to develop a consistent comprehensive
theory of recovery. Although the court generally limited the class of
plaintiffs who can recover as direct victims to those plaintiffs who
have a preexisting relationship with the defendant, it failed to estab-
lish which types of preexisting relationships can support direct victim
status. Furthermore, it failed to explain the relationship between di-
rect victim status and recovery based on an assumed duty (as in
(tristensen), or recovery based on a special relationship (as in Mar-
lene F.). For direct victims, the court appears to have abandoned its
desire to promote certainty and judicial efficiency, in favor of a case-
by-case or ad hoc approach.
148. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
149. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989).
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Responding to the policy reasons discussed above, the California
Supreme Court, in Thing, limited the class of plaintiffs who could re-
cover in bystander NIED cases to those plaintiffs who are likely to
suffer the most trauma. The court acknowledged that close relatives
foreseeably will suffer emotional distress when they learn of a loved
one's injury. Similarly, bystanders foreseeably will be distressed
when they witness an injury inflicted on an unrelated third party.
However, the court decided that simply being a member of one of
these two groups will not entitle a plaintiff to recover any emotional
distress damages. Only plaintiffs who are close relatives of the injury
victim and who are percipient witnesses to the injury producing
event can recover under Thing. These plaintiffs have endured an ab-
normal life experience and are particularly susceptible to emotional
harm. Based upon a balancing of policy concerns, the California
Supreme Court has determined that these plaintiffs should be the
only class of bystander plaintiffs entitled to recover their emotional
distress damages.
In response to the same policy considerations that controlled its de-
cision in Thing, the court should establish similarly strict prerequi-
sites for recovery in direct victim cases. Presumably, the court does
not intend to allow all victims with preexisting relationships to re-
cover NIED damages. Allowing all plaintiffs with a preexisting rela-
tionship to recover as direct victims would not adequately insulate
society from the costs of expansive liability, limit defendants' expo-
sure to an amount proportionate to their culpability, or avoid the liti-
gation of trivial claims. Balancing policy factors in each case to
determine whether a defendant has assumed a duty, as the court did
in CWristensen, will not promote certainty and judicial efficiency.
Clearly, not all preexisting relationships should lead to recovery in
direct victim actions. Just as the California Supreme Court limited
bystander recovery to those plaintiffs who are particularly suscepti-
ble to emotional distress, the court should limit recovery in the direct
victim cases to those plaintiffs who are particularly likely to suffer
severe emotional harm. The issue, then, is to determine which plain-
tiffs are the most susceptible to emotional distress injury.
Plaintiffs who have a preexisting relationship with the defendant
or who are closely related to an individual who has a preexisting re-
lationship with the defendant should recover for NIED if one of the
primary purposes of the preexisting relationship is to protect the
plaintiff's emotional well-being. These are the types of relationships
in which plaintiffs are most susceptible to emotional distress because
these plaintiffs have relied on the defendant to protect them from
emotional injury. Plaintiffs should recover as direct victims under
the primary purpose test if: (1) the plaintiff or an injury victim
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closely related to the plaintiff has a preexisting relationship with the
defendant; (2) one of the primary purposes of the preexisting rela-
tionship is to protect the plaintiff's emotional tranquility; and (3) as a
result of defendant's tortious conduct, the plaintiff suffers severe
emotional distress. This test satisfies the policy concerns the court
expressed in Thing. Requiring a close relationship will limit the
plaintiff class. Limiting the types of preexisting relationships that
qualify for direct victim status to those that are intended to protect
the plaintiff's emotional tranquility will insure that liability is pro-
portionate to culpability. Requiring proof of serious distress will
avoid the litigation of trivial claims. In addition, because this test is
consistent with the bystander limitations established in Thing, the
primary purpose test will promote certainty and judicial efficiency.
If the courts had applied the proposed primary purpose standard in
the recent California cases, they could have more easily reached con-
sistent results. In Christensen'50 and Quesada,151 the cases involving
the mishandling of corpses, the courts stressed the special obligations
of those dealing with the families of a decedent and the need for sen-
sitivity when dealing with the family's emotions. "[Tihe relationship
between the family of a decedent and a provider of funeral-related
services exists in major part for the purpose of relieving the bereaved
relatives of the obligation to personally prepare the remains for bur-
ial or cremation." 152 "A decent respect for their [the decedent's rela-
tives] feelings is implied in every contract for . . . services."15s The
courts should impose liability in mishandling of corpse cases not be-
cause "death is qualitatively different," but because one of the pri-
mary purposes of the services is to protect the emotional needs of the
decedent's close relatives.
Similarly, courts can use the proposed rule to consistently resolve
cases involving misconduct by therapists. The court should have im-
posed liability in Marlene F.154 because one of the primary goals of
the therapy was to protect the emotional well-being of the mothers
and the sons, both of whom were involved in the therapeutic rela-
tionship. In Schwarz,15 the primary purpose of the relationship was
to treat the son. By meeting with the father, the therapist intended
150. 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
151. 261 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
152. Christensen, 820 P.2d at 190 (Cal. 1991).
153. Id at 196.
154. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
155. 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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to aid in the treatment of the son, rather than protect the father's
emotional health. Therefore, the father in Schwarz should not have
recovered. Jacoves'56 is a more difficult case to resolve. Although
the primary goal of the therapy was to treat the son, the parents al-
leged that the therapy was also intended to benefit them. Although
one of the purposes of the therapy may have been to alleviate the
parents' anxiety over their son's emotional well-being, it was not
likely to have been a primary purpose of the therapy and the parents
should not recover.
In the cases involving attorney malpractice, Holliday57 and Bur-
ger,158 the courts should have denied recovery to the fianc6e and the
children because the attorney did not intend to protect the emotional
well-being of these plaintiffs through the attorney-client relationship.
In Holliday, the children were foreseeable victims but the purpose of
the criminal representation was not to protect their emotional well-
being. Similarly, in Burger, the attorney intended to represent and
protect the interests of the client and not the emotional security of
his fiancee.
Under the proposed test, the mother in Martin 159 should not have
recovered. The primary purpose of the relationship between the
mother and the day care center was to care for the child. Although
the mother's emotional distress damages were foreseeable, a primary
purpose of the relationship was not to care for her emotional needs.
Medical malpractice suits generally create the most troublesome
cases because health concerns, especially those related to birth and
death, are often intimately connected with emotional concerns. As a
result, people requiring medical treatment for themselves or a close
relative will often seek emotional reassurance as well. Medical treat-
ment cases often present very compelling circumstances for allowing
recovery. However, courts should generally deny recovery in these
types of actions because the primary purpose of the physician's treat-
ment is to protect the patient's health and not the emotional well-be-
ing of the patient's close relatives.
Plaintiffs, like the mother in Burgess, who suffer emotional dis-
tress damages as a result of medical malpractice directed at them
should recover. Similarly, plaintiffs closely related to medical injury
victims who qualify as percipient witnesses should recover as by-
stander witnesses. However, plaintiffs who cannot meet either of
these prerequisites should not recover their emotional distress
damages.
156. B052163, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058 (Cal. Ct. App 1992).
157. 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
158. 273 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
159. 779 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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Two types of NIED actions based upon medical malpractice arise
repeatedly: actions by parents based upon harm inflicted on their
child and actions by parents based upon negligence during childbirth
and delivery. In the cases not involving childbirth, the California
Supreme Court has denied recovery to parents suing for NIED unless
the parents meet the bystander prerequisites.160 Until Burgess, the
lower court holdings in negligent childbirth cases were inconsis-
tent.1 1 In Burgess, the California Supreme Court determined that
the physical link between the mother and her child and the emo-
tional nature of pregnancy and delivery justified imposing liability on
the physician for the mother's emotional distress damages.162
Although the physical link between a mother and her fetus is
unique, the emotional link is not unique. The emotional interest that
a pregnant mother has in the well-being of her fetus is not necessar-
ily any greater than the emotional interest that a father has in the
health of his fetus, a mother has in the health of her two-week-old
child, or a wife has in the health of her husband of fifty years. The
California Supreme Court has denied recovery for NIED to plaintiffs
who suffer emotional distress when their close relatives are victims
of medical malpractice. It has also indicated that fathers may not re-
cover as direct victims in negligent delivery cases. It should similarly
limit a pregnant mother's right to recover under the primary purpose
test. A mother delivering a child should recover damages for the
emotional distress she suffers as a result of any medical malpractice
in her treatment. Her recovery should not be related to the distress
she suffers from her child's injuries.
The parents in Golstein 63 should not have recovered because the
doctor intended to cure the child through radiation treatments and
did not intend to protect the parents' emotional well-being.
Anisodon'6 4 presents compelling facts, but the mother's recovery
should be limited. Under the primary purpose test, the mother
should only recover the emotional distress damages she suffered
from receiving an improper uterine incision. She should not recover
for the emotional distress that resulted from her child being
160. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985)
161. Compare Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) and Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) with Mar-
tinez v. County of Los Angeles, 231 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
162. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1202, 1203 (Cal. 1992).
163. 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
164. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991),
review dismissed, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4220 (Cal. 1992).
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harmed. 65 The father in Anisodon should not recover because the
primary purpose of the physician-patient relationship was not to pro-
tect his emotional well-being.
Although many persons are foreseeable emotional distress victims,
the Thing prerequisites strictly limit the class of bystander plaintiffs
who can recover for NIED to those most susceptible to emotional in-
jury. Similarly, the primary purpose test will limit the class of direct
victim plaintiffs entitled to recover to those who are most vulnerable
to emotional distress. Although many other plaintiffs will forseeably
suffer emotional harm, they should not recover based on the policy
reasons the court emphasized in Thing. The primary purpose test
will limit defendants' liability to an amount in proportion to their
culpability, will insulate society from the costs of expansive liability,
and will promote certainty in the law, as well as judicial efficiency
and economy.
CONCLUSION
Just as the court rejected principles of general foreseeability in
favor of bright line tests for bystander NIED cases, the court should
establish more specific guidelines for direct victim actions. The re-
cent California Supreme Court cases allowing recovery in direct vic-
tim cases fail to provide any meaningful criteria for the lower courts
to apply.
This article proposes a three-part primary purpose test: (1) the
plaintiff or an injury victim closely related to the plaintiff must have
a preexisting relationship with the defendant; (2) one of the primary
purposes of the preexisting relationship must be to protect the plain-
tiff's emotional tranquility; and (3) as a result of defendant's tortious
conduct, the plaintiff must suffer severe emotional distress. The ap-
plication of this three-part test will lead to consistent results and will
limit defendants' exposure to an amount proportionate to their
culpability.
165. Even if the mother is allowed to recover under the Burgess test, her recovery
for NIED should be minimal. In Burgess, the court limited the recoverable damages to
those that resulted from participating in a negligent delivery. At the time of delivery,
the mother in Anisodon was unaware that any negligence in the delivery resulted in
physical damage to her child. The mother discovered that the doctor's failing to make
a larger uterine incision caused her child's problems three years after the delivery.
Anisodon was unaware she participated in an "abnormal event" until three years after
the event occurred.
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